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Abstract 
This study supported the claim that corporate governance (CG) mechanisms are able to overcome earnings management 
(EM) activities specifically from the perspective of family owned companies (FOC) and the non-family owned companies 
(NFOC). A total sample of 264 public listed companies (PLCs), selected based on stratified samplings, were tested.  The 
results showed that for FOC, only number of board meetings held; while for NFOC, independence of directors, audit 
committee, non-duality, audit committee size, in-house internal audit function and quality differentiated auditors are the 
CG mechanisms that are found to be able to assist in minimizing the EM activities.   
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1. Introduction 
     Corporate governance (CG) mechanisms guarantee investors that they will receive adequate return on their 
investment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Thus, it justifies the necessity for this study to prod into the ability of 
the CG mechanisms in overcoming earnings management (EM) so that reliable financial statements could be 
produced. EM happens when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to 
alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholder about the underlying economic performance of the 
company, or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers (Healy and 
Wahlen, 1999). This study is done on the distinction of family owned companies (FOC) and non-family 
owned companies (NFOC) so as to provide evidence to the knowledge gap on the types of CG mechanisms 
that could assist in overcoming EM during the recent financial crisis between these two groups, specifically 
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from the perspective of a developing country, Malaysia. The findings supported the claim that CG 
mechanisms are able to overcome EM activities in the FOC and NFOC. 
2. Literature Review 
     Finance Committee on CG in Malaysia in the Report on GC (2002) defines CG as: ‘The process and 
structure used to direct and manage the business and affairs of the company towards enhancing business 
prosperity and corporate accountability with the ultimate objective of realizing long term shareholders value, 
whilst taking into account the interests of other stakeholders’ (HLFC, 2000).  
     Under CG mechanisms, board of directors (BOD) is considered as the central point in providing effective 
oversight over a company’s financial reporting system to the stakeholders.  These includes presence of an 
independent non-executive director (NED) (Jaggi et al., 2009; non-duality (Gulzar and Wang, 2011); and 
non-multiple directorship  (Dhaliwal et al. 2010).  The presence of an independent NED could provide 
effective monitoring mechanism for EM (Jaggi et al., 2009, while Gulzar and Wang, 2011, find that the 
existence of chief executive officer (CEO) duality is positively related to discretionary accruals as duality 
enhances further the CEO's position and power, providing ample opportunities for management discretion. 
Further, Dhaliwal et al., 2010, state that accrual quality is positively related to accounting experts who has 
fewer multiple directorships. 
     Besides BOD, the audit committee (AC) (Ahmad-Zaluki and Wan-Hussin, 2010; Abed et al., 2012 ),  
internal audit function (Prawitt et al., 2009), and quality differentiated auditor (the Big Eight/Big Six/Big 
Five/Big Four) also play CG role for a company (Fan and Wong, 2005). Ahmad-Zaluki and Wan-Hussin, 
2010, provide evidence that for those companies with a higher percentage of NED in the AC would indeed 
exhibit greater forecast accuracy.  Abed et al., 2012, provide evidence that having large board would assist in 
hindering the incidence of EM as in a large board size there is varied expertise among its members that could 
assist in identifying any misconduct arisen.  Further, the overall internal audit function has a significant 
relation with absolute abnormal accruals (Prawitt et al., 2009); and quality differentiated auditor (the Big 
Eight/Big Six/Big Five/Big Four) also plays CG role for a company (Fan and Wong, 2005).  The latter is 
supported by Che-Ahmad and Mansor, 2009, who state that the presence of such auditor would hinder the 
auditee from involving in income smoothing activities. 
     In addition to CG mechanisms, corporate ownership structures of a FOC and NFOC are also incorporated 
into the study’s model equation. This is because Fama and Jensen, 1983, have stated that the presence of the 
founding family with strong equity position and their ability to have control over the management, present an 
advantage for the family to monitor the business. Additionally, founding FOC have less incentive to manage 
the companies’ earnings as they face lesser pressure to meet or beat earnings expectation (Jiraporn and 
DaDalt, 2009).   
     In addition, control variables that have significant influence on a company’s ability and propensity to 
engage in EM are also included.  These include; firstly profitability.  Saleh et al., 2005, state that company 
which is making losses would have higher tendency to be involved in EM activities.  Secondly is the company 
size.  Che-Ahmad and Mansor, 2009, discover that smaller size companies have the tendency to be involved 
in income smoothing activities as their actions would not be scrutinized.  Thirdly is the debt. Companies that 
use high levels of debt are exposed to increase levels of institutional monitoring, which would decrease the 
company’s ability to manage its earnings (Becker et al., 1998).   
 
 
 
223 N. Mansor et al. /  Procedia Economics and Finance  7 ( 2013 )  221 – 229 
3. Methods 
3.1.         Data Selection 
     This study employs secondary data approach.  The target population for this study is defined as all the 
companies listed in Bursa Malaysia Berhad as of 31st December 2008, excluding finance companies.  
Information was gathered from the respective companies’ annual reports retrieved from the Bursa Malaysia 
Berhad website and also from Datastream. Stratified random sampling technique was employed in order to 
obtain the required sample of 264 public listed companies (PLCs).   
3.2. Methodology 
3.2.1. Theoretical Framework 
 
    All the testable variables, both dependent and independent, are being summarized in Figure 1. 
 
Independent Variables                  Dependent Variable 
 
 
 
    Control Variables 
 
 
Fig. 1: Theoretical Framework 
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3.2.2. Equation Model 
 
     This study employs multiple regression analyses, and the research model for the study is as follows: 
EM = α0 + α1BDINED i + α2NONDUAL i + α3NMDS i + α4ACINED i + α5ACFE i + α6BDNMi + 
α7ACNM i + α8BDATTND i + α9ACATTND i + α10BDSIZE i + α11ACSIZE i + α12OIAF i + α13AUD i 
+ α14FAMILY i + α15PROFIT i + α16COMPSIZE i + α17DEBT i + εI                            (1) 
 
3.2.3. Measuring Earnings Management 
     In this study, the cross-sectional version of the Modified-Jones model is being employed to measure EM 
(Becker et al., 1998; Davidson et al., 2005).  Under this Discretionary Total Accruals method, all variables 
are scaled by the beginning of the period total assets as follows:   
ACCRi,t/TAi,t-1 = α0(1/ TAi,t-1) + α1(Δ REVi,t – ΔRECi,,t /TAi,t-1) + α2(PPEi,t /TAi,t-1) + εi,t                    (2) 
where ACCRi,t     =  Total Accruals for company i in year t (measured as the difference between 
earnings before extraordinary items and cash flows from operations) 
Variables Operationalization Presentation Expected Sign 
Independent non-executive 
director (INED) in the board of 
directors  
‘1’ for companies that have one third or more of the board 
members being INED and ‘0’ for otherwise 
BDINED - 
None existence of Duality role of 
chairman and chief executive 
officer 
1 for companies that have non-duality, and 0 for otherwise NONDUAL +/- 
Non-multiple directorships 1 for companies that do not have multiple directorships, and 0 
for otherwise 
NMDS +/- 
INED in the Audit Committee 
(AC) 
‘1’ for companies that have all of the members in the audit 
committee being INED, and ‘0’ for otherwise 
ACINED - 
AC  financial expertise   1 for companies that have a person being a member of an 
accounting associates or body, and 0 for otherwise 
ACFE - 
Numbers of BOD meetings Number of Board meetings per annum BDNM +/- 
Numbers of AC meetings Number of AC meetings per annum ACNM - 
Members’ Attendance during 
BOD meetings 
Percentage of members’ attendance during Board meetings BDATTND - 
Members’ Attendance during 
AC meetings 
Percentage of members’ attendance during AC meetings ACATTND - 
Size of the board Number of members on the board BDSIZE +/- 
Size of the AC Number of members in the audit committee ACSIZE - 
Outsource Internal audit function  1 for companies that have outsource internal audit function, and 
0 for otherwise 
OIAF +/- 
Quality differentiated auditor 1 for companies that have quality differentiated auditor, and 0 
for otherwise 
AUD - 
Family controlled companies 1 for companies that are family owned, and 0 for otherwise FAMILY +/- 
Profitability The ratio of income before extraordinary items to equity PROFIT - 
Size of the company Natural logarithm of total assets COMPSIZE - 
Debt The ratio of total debt to total assets DEBT +/- 
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TAi,t-1   =  Total assets for company i in year t 
Δ REVi,t  = Change in net sales for company i in year t 
ΔRECi,t   = Change in receivables for company i in year t 
PPEi.t  = Gross property, plant and equipment for company i in year t 
εi,t                    = The regression error terms, assumed cross-sectionally uncorrelated and normally      
distributed with mean zero. 
 
Discretionary or managed accruals for each company i is:  
DAC i,t = ACCR i,t / TA i,t-1 – (α0 (1/TA(i,i-t) )+ α1 ((Δ REVi,t – ΔRECi,t )/ TAi,t-1) + α2(PPEi,t/TAi,t-1))                 (3) 
where  α0, α1 and α2 = the fitted coefficients from equation (2) 
DAC i,t  =  the managed component of total accruals for sample company i in year t, which is equal to 
discretionary accruals, and all other variables are as previously determined. 
4. Findings and Discussion 
     Table 1 summarizes the pertinent results of the main model for the study.  The BDINED, ACINED, 
NMDS, ACSIZE and COMPSIZE were found to be significant negatively related to EM. It proves that firstly, 
by having INED on the BOD and AC was able to assist in hindering EM from taking place.   This is because 
these directors, who have no direct interest in the companies, would act on behalf of the shareholders in 
mitigating the agency problems, such as EM (Jaggi et al., 2009) and they would be able to offer professional 
advice to the management (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  
            Table 1: Multiple Regression Results of the Main Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: *** Significant at 0.001 level; ** Significant at 0.05 level; * Significant at 0.1 level; a = one-tail-
test; b = two-tail-test. EM = Earnings Management measured via Discretionary Accruals based on 
Modified Jones; BDINED = Board Independent non-executive director; NMDS = No Multiple 
Directorship; ACINED = INED in the Audit committee; BDNM = Number of board meetings; ACSIZE = 
DV = EM Coefficients t-stat Sig.  VIF        Tolerance 
(Constant) 0.16 1.45 0.15    
BDINED -0.03 -1.65 0.10 **a 0.89 1.12 
NMDS -0.02 -1.83 0.07 **b 0.84 1.20 
ACINED -0.02 -2.09 0.04 **a 0.72 1.39 
BDNM 0.00 -1.28 0.20 *b 0.74 1.35 
ACSIZE -0.01 -1.50 0.14 *a 0.74 1.35 
OIAF 0.01 1.57 0.12 *a 0.80 1.25 
PROFIT 0.26 14.75 0.00 ***a 0.86 1.17 
COMPSIZE -0.02 -2.44 0.02 **a 0.48 2.08 
Adjusted R2 48.2% 
F-Value 15.42*** 
Durbin-Watson 1.89 
Standard residual  - Maximum  / Minimum 2.79 / -2.59 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 26% 
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Size of the audit committee; OIAF = Outsource internal audit function; PROFIT = Profitability; 
COMPSIZE = Company size. 
 
 
     Secondly, by not holding too many directorships would enable a director to be more effective monitor as 
he has more time to spend on each company (Morck et al., 1988) relative to if he was to hold too many 
directorships in various companies at any point of time.  Thirdly, a small size audit committee is more 
effective in overcoming the problem of EM as larger size of audit committee would only make available 
ample rooms for courtesy among the members (Yermack, 1996).  Such a situation would cause the members 
to overlook the EM activities done by the management. Fourthly, bigger company size is less involved in EM 
as it is better governed, capable to maintain effective internal control systems and able to appoint quality 
differentiated auditors (Black et al., 2006).  In fact the finding is in line with the result by Che-Ahmad and 
Mansor, 2009, that discovered the fact that the smaller the size of the companies, the higher is their inclination 
to smoothen their income.  
     The BDNM, OIAF and PROFIT were found to be significant positively related to EM.  The results show 
that firstly, when the BDNM held is frequent, the level of the EM activity is also high (Gulzar and Wang, 
2011 ).  This could be due to the presence of courtesy and diplomacy among the members (Yermack, 1996) 
during the board meetings.  Such situation would enable the management to take opportunity of the situation 
to manage the company’s earnings as they believe that their unhealthy activity would go unnoticed. Secondly, 
the PLCs prefer to adopt the in-house internal audit function in order to minimize the probability of leakage of 
their companies’ vital information (Klosek, 2005) when an outsourced internal audit function is employed. 
     Thirdly, since the expected coefficient estimate for profitability is negative; that is the larger the 
companies’ profitability, the lower is their participation in EM, then the findings from this study is peculiar.  
A good reason could be due to the financial crisis that had cropped up in the year 2007.  Since the sample 
companies were selected from among the companies with financial reports during the financial year ending 
2008, then the 2007 financial crisis would have a certain degree of impact on these companies’ business 
operations during the year 2008.   This is supported by Saleh et al., 2005, who highlighted the fact that when 
companies were making losses during that particular financial year, then their managers would have the 
inclination to manage the companies’ earnings.  It is done with the intention either to send positive signals to 
the market or to reduce the impact of negative signals originated from financial distress. 
     Further, additional tests were carried out on the 264 sample companies where they were split into FOC and 
NFOC. It is done in order to ascertain whether different CG mechanisms are needed to overcome the EM 
problem when these PLCs were compared on this basis. The pertinent results for FOC are recorded in the 
Table 2. From the analyses conducted, it can be seen that BDNM is significant (p<0.01) negatively related to 
EM for the FOC.  This proves that the number of meetings held by the BOD is found to be of importance in 
overcoming EM as during those frequent meetings, the directors could improve their interaction among 
themselves as well as with the company’s managers (Eisenhardt, 1989).  However, the reverse holds true for 
BDATTDN during those meetings which is found to be significant (p<0.05) positively related to EM.  
Possible reason could be that the family members themselves would normally be appointed to hold posts in 
the BOD.  Then it came as no surprise when these family members who attended those meetings would 
tolerate certain matters as it may involve either their own parents and siblings, or even their relatives.  In such 
situations, the management could have the opportunity to manage the company’s earnings without being 
detected or observed. 
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  Table 2: Multiple Regression Results for the Family Owned Companies 
 
  
               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
             Notes: *** Significant at 0.001 level; ** Significant at 0.05 level; * Significant at 0.1 level; a = 
one-tail-test; b = two-tail-test. EM = Earnings Management measured via Discretionary Accruals 
based on Modified Jones; BDNM = Number of board meetings; BATTDN = Directors’ attendance 
during board meetings; BDSIZE = Size of the board of directors PROFIT = Profitability. 
 
 
     Next, BDSZ was found to be significant positively related to EM.  This implies that the larger the board 
size, the higher is the chances of EM to occur. Since the family members would be appointed to hold the 
important roles in the organization, then again the level of diplomacy among them would ease the practice of 
EM by the management. Further, PROFIT was found to be significant (p<0.01) positively related to earnings 
management. Reason to this peculiar result is as per mentioned earlier.  
     As for the NFOC, the results are as tabulated in Table 3.  From Table 3, the CG mechanisms that have 
significant negative relation to EM are BDINED, ACINED, ACSIZE, NONDUAL and AUD.  The first three 
results are as per discussed earlier.  As for the presence of non-duality, it could allow transparent business 
dealings to take place and this would definitely assist in safe-guarding the interest of the shareholders. This 
finding is supported by Saleh, et al., 2005, who state that the presence of duality is positively related to 
discretionary accruals as duality enhances further the CEO’s position and power.  In other words, the presence 
of non-duality is an aid to the ailment of EM problem.  This is because when there is separation of duties, then 
all decision made for the company’s business transactions could be done is a more transparent manner. Table 3: 
Multiple Regression Results for the Non-Family Owned Companies 
               Table 3: Multiple Regression Results for the Non-Family Owned Companies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes:*** Significant at 0.001 level; ** Significant at 0.05 level; * Significant at 0.1 level. EM = 
Earnings Management measured via Discretionary Accruals based on Modified Jones; BDINED = 
Board   Independent non-executive director; NONDUAL = No Duality; ACINED = INED in the 
Audit committee; BDNM = Number of board meetings; ACSIZE = Size of the audit committee; 
OIAF = Outsource internal audit function; AUD = Qualified differentiated auditors; PROFIT = 
Profitability. 
DV = EM Coefficients t-stat Sig.  VIF Tolerance 
BDNM -0.02 -3.33 0.00 ***a 0.86 1.17 
BDATTND 0.27 2.38 0.02 **a 0.76 1.32 
BDSIZE 0.01 1.36 0.18 *b 0.72 1.40 
PROFIT 0.19 4.21 0.00 ***a 0.73 1.37 
n=124 companies 
Adjusted R2 22.3% 
F-Value 3.21 
Durbin-Watson 1.81 
Standard residual  - Maximum  / Minimum 2.66 / -2.28 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 10% 
DV = EM Coefficients t-stat Sig.  VIF Tolerance 
BDINED -0.08 -2.79 0.01 **a 0.85 1.18 
NONDUAL -0.03 -1.48 0.14 *b 0.91 1.10 
ACINED -0.03 -1.79 0.08 **a 0.75 1.33 
BDNM 0.01 1.71 0.09 *b 0.58 1.74 
ACSIZE -0.02 -1.49 0.14 *a 0.72 1.39 
OIAF 0.03 2.37 0.02 **b 0.65 1.53 
AUD -0.03 -2.34 0.02 **a 0.72 1.38 
PROFIT 0.27 14.86 0.00 ***a 0.84 1.19 
n=140 companies 
Adjusted R2 65.7% 
F-Value 17.67 
Durbin-Watson 2.04 
Standard residual  - Maximum  / Minimum 2.48 / -2.83 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 78% 
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     Next is concerning to the quality differentiated auditor.  Since this type of auditor is able to provide a 
significant constraint on EM (Becker et al., 1998) and income smoothing (Che-Ahmad and Mansor, 2009) for 
the PLCs; then it is of no surprise when the clients of non-quality differentiated auditor report relatively more 
discretionary accruals. As for the outsourced internal audit function (OIAF), it is found to be significant 
(p<0.05) but positively related to EM. This indicates that NFOCs prefer to appoint an in-house internal audit 
function so as not to lose any of their intellectual property (Glass, 2004) or  to put  their data privacy at stake 
(Klosek, 2005). 
5. Conclusions, Limitations and Future Research 
     This study shows that when regression is done on the total sample companies as a whole, the board 
independence, AC independence, AC size, non-multiple directorship, in-house internal audit function and the 
company size are among the CG mechanisms that could assist in overcoming the problem of EM. However, 
when regression is done on the distinction of corporate ownership structures of FOC and NFOC, different CG 
mechanisms were found to be effective to control for the EM activities in those respective corporate 
ownership structures.  
     While, only the number of board meetings is found to be significant negatively related to EM for the FOC; 
more CG mechanisms seem to be effective in the NFOC. These include the board independence, AC 
independence, AC size, non-duality and the quality differentiated auditor. From here it can be seen that CG 
mechanisms seem to have more impact among the NFOC in overcoming EM. The interference by the family 
members in FOC could have caused the CG mechanisms to lose its impact in overcoming the EM problem. 
     In gist, the findings provide further evidence to the existing literature pertaining to the CG mechanisms 
that could assist in controlling EM, specifically from the perspective of FOC and NFOC. As for the 
limitations, the result obtain could not be generalized to finance based companies and other non-PLCs. Thus, 
for future research, study on EM and CG from the perspective of the FOC and NFOC could be carried out 
from the angle of the non-PLCs. 
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